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What is treason? In common parlance, it is the betrayal of a trust. In English common
law, it was compassing the death of the king or his family, or a conspiracy against him. When
Parliament beheaded Charles I, it changed the definition to waging war against the nation. Many
of the framers of the federal Constitution had served in the Continental Congress or the
Continental Army in the late war against Great Britain. They had committed treason against the
crown, but no one was executed for treason by British authorities. Instead, a precedent was set to
treat soldiers and political leaders of the United States as subjects in rebellion, but not traitors.
The federal Constitution followed this, rather than the older English, precedent, defining treason
as levying war against the United States or giving aid and comfort to its enemies, presumably in
wartime. When western Pennsylvania farmers burned the home of a tax collector and threatened
his life, they were tried and convicted of treason, but pardoned. Their defense was that their
violent acts were not directed against the nation, but against the person of the tax collector. The
Constitution also required that a defendant be present when the treasonous act was committed. It
was this provision that allowed Aaron Burr to escape conviction for acts done in his absence.
States had treason provisions in their laws as well, and the most infamous of these cases was the
Virginia prosecution of John Brown and his comrades for their raid on the Harpers Ferry armory.
The case should have gone into the federal courts, as Harpers Ferry was federal land, but the
federal district judge did not object to Virginia prosecuting Brown.
Were the officers of the Confederate armed forces and the political leaders of the
Confederacy traitors? They did levy war against the United States, but if the Confederacy was an
independent nation, as it claimed, then the war was a belligerency between sovereign powers and
not a civil war or insurrection by citizens of the United States against their government. In fact
and in law prior cases offered little clear precedent. During the war, in the so-called Prize Cases
involving the seizure of ships violating the blockade of the Confederacy, lawyers for the federal
government argued that the distinction between belligerency, governed by internal law of war,
and civil insurrection, a crime in federal law, did not matter. The need to save the Union trumped
everything else. Lawyers for the confiscated ships and cargos argued that the federal government
could not have it both ways, and that even under federal law, the Blockade, proclaimed by
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President Abraham Lincoln in April, was not constitutionally sound until Congress agreed in
July.
What then to do with the former Confederates when victory over the Confederacy was
assured and the government of the Confederacy had in fact ceased to exist? None of the officers
who led Confederate troops were prosecuted for treason. They were at first barred from
participation in state and federal government, and later pardoned. If they had not committed a
crime, neither the prohibition not the blanket pardon made any sense. But again, as in the
blockade, practical considerations overruled legal consistency. If the Union was to include
former southern states, or if they had never left the Union, peace between the sections required
that former Confederate officers and political leaders be rehabilitated as citizens.
The tension between strict legalism and practical politics was perfectly illustrated in the
treatment of Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Cynthia Nicoletti holds both the J.D. and the
Ph. D. and the present work demonstrates her facility in both law and political history. She
rightly treats the prosecution of Davis as a story rather than a legal treatise, bringing alive the
people and the problems on both sides of the case. Davis’s trial was supposed to be the test case
of the legality of secession, but he was never actually tried. Held in a Richmond prison, his jury
would have been sympathetic to his plight, and thus a danger, even when picked by federal
marshals. Could he have been acquitted, a backdoor vindication of the right of secession? Would
that have thrown the fruits of victory away? If convicted, would others like Robert E. Lee and
Alexander H. Stephens follow? Certainly, Chief Justice Salmon Chase worried about this
outcome, as did Davis’s prosecutors, and ironically, Davis’s defense counsel. So, the prosecutors
delayed with the active connivance of the defense counsel.
With no trial whose ins and outs to follow, Nicoletti turns her attention to the counsel in
the cause, Charles O’Connor for Davis, and William Evarts for the prosecution. Watching
closely were President Andrew Johnson and the members of his cabinet, themselves divided over
whether to try Davis for treason or for war crimes, and whether to use a military tribunal or a
civil jury trial. Varina Davis, Jefferson’s wife, was active in his defense, reaching out to his
former Senate colleagues, members of newly readmitted Mississippi’s state bar, and even old
northern friends. Here are their stories, reminding us of the remarkable civility of this civil war,
in part because of the central role that lawyers on both sides played during and after the
hostilities.
In subsequent chapters, Nicoletti’s cast of characters widens out from those immediately
involved in the case to those who had a stake in Davis’ fate. There is Clement Clay, who after
pardon never recanted his view that secession was legal, and so did Jubal Early and Stephens.
James Longstreet thought the opposite—surrender of the army meant surrender of the claim to
legitimacy. Robert E. Lee agreed (testifying before the grand jury against Davis). Future
President James Garfield worried that former Confederates never accepted the verdict of the
battlefield. The battle of history would have to be won. Republican members of Congress
weighed in as well, seeking to punish former rebels with legislation. For a time, the very idea of
the rule of law seemed in peril. Attorney general James Speed saved the day, advising Congress
that a rush to judgment imperiled future prospects for a peaceable Reconstruction. Gradually,
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public sentiment followed the same course, from demands for Davis’ immediate execution to
greater caution (a change in public opinion that O’Connor in part orchestrated).
The grand jury hearings provide the next scenes, allowing Nicoletti to parse out the
difference between district (trial) and circuit (trial) courts. The former, over which a single
district court judge presided, could not handle federal felonies. The latter required the presence
of district court judge John C. Underwood and Chief Justice Chase, riding circuit. Underwood
pressed for a pro-Union grand jury and trial jury, but Chase, perhaps because he still had the
presidency in mind, simply refused to attend. More than Underwood, Chase knew that the real
issue lay in the federal courts of the newly reincorporated states. If these could not meet because
of local opposition, Reconstruction itself might fail. Behind his concerns lay the uncertain status
of the former members of the Confederacy. Where they conquered? Had they ever left? Could
they?
There’s so much more here—radical reconstruction; the impeachment of President
Johnson, the re-occupation of the recalcitrant South. But enough—let Nicoletti tell the rest of the
story. One cannot leave this review, however, without saying how remarkably thorough was her
research; how well she argues her points; and how clearly and compellingly she writes.
Bravissima.
Peter Charles Hoffer teaches American history at the University of Georgia. His Uncivil
Warriors: The Lawyers’ Civil War will appear in late Spring from Oxford University Press,
followed by his co-authored The Clamor of Lawyers: The American Revolution and Crisis of the
Legal Profession from Cornell.
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